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Both the multidimensional phenomenon and the polysemous notion of consciousness
continue to prove resistant to consistent measurement and unambiguous definition.
This is hardly surprising, given that there is no agreement even as regards the most
fundamental issues they involve. One of the basic disagreements present in the
continuing debate about consciousness pertains to its gradational nature. The general
aim of this article is to show how consciousness might be graded and multidimensional
at the same time. We therefore focus on the question of what it is, exactly, that is or
could be graded in cases of consciousness, and how we can measure it. Ultimately, four
different gradable aspects of consciousness will be described: quality, abstractness,
complexity and usefulness, which belong to four different dimensions, these being
understood, respectively, as phenomenal, semantic, physiological, and functional.
Consequently, consciousness may be said to vary with respect to phenomenal quality,
semantic abstraction, physiological complexity, and functional usefulness. It is hoped
that such a four-dimensional approach will help to clarify and justify claims about
the hierarchical nature of consciousness. The approach also proves explanatorily
advantageous, as it enables us not only to draw attention to certain new and important
differences in respect of subjective measures of awareness and to justify how a given
creature may be ranked higher in one dimension of consciousness and lower in terms
of another, but also allows for innovative explanations of a variety of well-known
phenomena (amongst these, the interpretations of blindsight and locked-in syndrome
will be briefly outlined here). Moreover, a 4D framework makes possible many predictions
and hypotheses that may be experimentally tested (We point out a few such possibilities
pertaining to interdimensional dependencies).
Keywords: graded consciousness, multidimensional consciousness, dimensions of consciousness, measures of
consciousness, levels of consciousness
INTRODUCTION
Complex as it is, the phenomenon of consciousness is hard to either measure (Seth
et al., 2008; Overgaard et al., 2010; Sandberg et al., 2010; Szczepanowski et al., 2013;
Wierzchon´ et al., 2014) or define properly (Pareira and Ricke, 2009; Velmans, 2009;
Jonkisz, 2015). It is sometimes described in rough terms as ‘all that we experience
when not in a dreamless sleep or coma’ (see Searle, 2000). However, within scientific
practice consciousness is mainly characterized operationally, by certain behavioral and/or
neurophysiological indicators such as reportable contents, goal-directed and adaptive behavior, or
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recurrent processing in the thalamocortical structures (see
Damasio, 1999; Crick and Koch, 2003; Edelman, 2003; Lamme,
2006; Baars, 2012; Baars et al., 2013; Feinberg and Mallatt, 2013).
The reportability requirement may suggest that consciousness is
limited to humans, primates and a few other highly developed
species (see Carruthers, 1998), but it has also sometimes been
ascribed to various other – far more ‘ancient’ – creatures
(ranging from vertebrates generally to insects and lampreys –
see Feinberg and Mallatt, 2013, 2016; also Edelman and Seth,
2009; Boly et al., 2013). Furthermore, its scope of application
has even been extended beyond living organisms (Tononi, 2004,
2008, 2010; Chella and Manzotti, 2007; Koch, 2012; Tononi
and Koch, 2014). The range of consciousness also varies with
respect to biological mechanisms: that is to say, it is most
often correlated with a widespread neuronal activation in higher
thalamocortical structures (Dehaene and Changeux, 2011; Baars
et al., 2013), yet more localized, lower-level activities are also
sometimes deemed responsible for consciousness (see Lamme,
2006; Edelman et al., 2011; Långsjö et al., 2012). The question
of just how low we should look, in searching for the most
basic forms and mechanisms of consciousness, is particularly
apposite when adopting, as we do here, a gradational approach
to the phenomenon, as it may lead to some counterintuitive
consequences, such as ascribing certain levels of consciousness to
all organisms or even to primitive artificial systems (see Tononi,
2004, 2008, 2010; Koch, 2012; Jonkisz, 2015).
To be sure, it is most unlikely that individuals could be
“...ordered on the basis of how conscious they are, just as they
can be ordered on the basis of their age, height, or blood
pressure” (Bayne et al., 2016, p. 406). Attempts to analyze
consciousness in terms of successive ‘levels,’ ‘grades,’ or ‘orders’
are strongly criticized in the article just cited for being (in that
author’s opinion) one-dimensional – and, indeed, we ourselves
are sympathetic to the multidimensional approach presented
there. Nevertheless, the fact that a given conscious creature may
be ranked higher in one aspect or dimension (e.g., responsiveness,
neuronal activation patterns) and lower in other (e.g., capacity
or quality of content) does not render the question about the
gradability of consciousness either less attractive or irrelevant
(as might seem to be the case after reading Bayne et al.,
2016). That question remains perfectly valid. Indeed, it is even
more interesting to analyze gradability as it relates to different
dimensions of consciousness – and this is, in fact, the principal
aim of the present article. To be clear, the article will not discuss
whether consciousness is graded or all-or-none (see Sergent and
Dehaene, 2004; Overgaard et al., 2006; Windey et al., 2013, 2014;
Anzulewicz et al., 2015; Andersen et al., 2016; Bayne et al., 2016),
as its main objective is rather to shed light on how, and in what
sense, consciousness might be graded while at the same time
being multidimensional.
It is by no means clear whether gradedness pertains only
to phenomenal contents themselves, or also to global states
of consciousness, or, maybe, other aspects or dimensions of
the phenomenon as well (see Bayne et al., 2016, where global
states of consciousness are defined as “states of consciousness
that characterize an organism’s overall conscious condition. An
organism can be in only one global state of consciousness at a
time [...],” p. 406). The article tackles that problem by seeking
to determine what, exactly, it is that is, or might be, graded
in consciousness. Four different gradable aspects belonging to
four different dimensions of consciousness will be described;
therefore, the methodological question of how to measure
those hierarchies is, in effect, also in due course addressed.
Furthermore, the findings presented here may ultimately help to
answer certain more general questions: e.g., how science should
compare and assess consciousness across different species (Griffin
and Speck, 2004; Seth et al., 2005; Edelman and Seth, 2009; Boly
et al., 2013; Feinberg and Mallatt, 2013, 2016), or in artificial
systems (Hollande, 2003; Chella and Manzotti, 2007; Torrance
et al., 2007; Clowes and Seth, 2008; Kurzweil, 2012; O’Regan,
2012), and whether it is right to say that there are developmental
differences in respect of conscious grades/levels over the course
of the lives of individual organisms (Stuss and Anderson, 2004;
Zelazo, 2004; Kouider et al., 2013). Ultimately, it is for the
future to determine whether or not these results are explanatorily
advantageous; nevertheless, some of their possible applications
are already outlined in the closing sections here.
FOUR DIMENSIONS OF
CONSCIOUSNESS
In order to analyze gradability as it relates to different dimensions
of consciousness, it is necessary to first specify what the
dimensions in question themselves consist in. Unfortunately,
there is no agreement with respect to this fundamental
issue, since no unambiguous characterization of the actual
phenomenon exists. In spite of this, there is certainly a plethora
of meanings associated with the term, and multiple varieties
of consciousness that one may encounter as one engages
with the different domains involved in its explanation (see
Jonkisz, 2012). In fact, in the vast field of consciousness studies
the phenomenon has already been described in terms that
imply different dimensions: e.g., as a subjective experience or
phenomenally integrated content, as a higher-order or self-
representational state, as a state produced by recurrent processing
in the thalamocortical structures, and as an adaptation which
enables one to behave appropriately, adapt to new situations,
learn, understand emotions, differentiate, and choose, etc.
(Rosenthal, 1986; Baars, 1994, 2002, 2012; Block, 1995; Chalmers,
1995; Lycan, 1996; Damasio, 1999; Crick and Koch, 2003;
Edelman, 2003; Tononi, 2004; Gennaro, 2005; Kriegel, 2006,
2007; Lamme, 2006; Dehaene and Changeux, 2011; Feinberg
and Mallatt, 2013, etc.). Consequently, it seems reasonable to
differentiate the following four dimensions of consciousness:
the phenomenological, the semantic, the physiological, and the
functional (adapted from Jonkisz, 2012, 2015). Each of these will
be characterized below.
The Phenomenological Dimension
The dimension refers to the subjective or experiential character
of consciousness. To describe ‘what it is like’ to see something,
feel pain, move, talk, think, etc., one must undergo that very
experience of seeing, feeling, moving, talking, thinking, etc.,
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oneself. This is because conscious experiences are individuated
relative to a given subject’s perspective, and as such are unique
in the way they present themselves, appear or feel (something
which is in fact biologically justified – see Jonkisz, 2016). That is
the simple reason for why our scientific (epistemically objective)
explanations of (epistemically subjective) experience are obliged
to be indirect: i.e., report-based. In short, the phenomenological
dimension captures the experiential, non-relational aspect of
consciousness.
The Semantic Dimension
The dimension has to do with the referential nature of
consciousness, which is sometimes also characterized as transitive
or intentional (see Rosenthal, 1986; Searle, 1992, 2000).
Consciousness carries a certain referential content, as it is about
certain things or objects we perceive, think of, feel, remember,
or imagine. Sometimes it may appear as if there is no particular
object to name or point to: e.g., in cases of conscious pains,
moods, emotions, etc. Yet even in these cases it may be said
that consciousness refers to, or is about, the very experience of
pain, mood, emotion, etc., and that the information it conveys
means something for the subject (see Cleeremans, 2011). It may
therefore be said that conscious states are intentional in the
classical Brentanian sense, but “[b]ecause intentional states are
of or about things other than themselves, for a state to have
intentionality is for it to have semantic properties” (Pierre, 2003).
In short, the semantic dimension captures the relational aspect
of consciousness, not its experiential, non-relational, qualitative
characteristics: we are asking here about ‘what it is about’ or ‘what
its reference is,’ not ‘what it is like to have it.’
The Physiological Dimension
The dimension concerns bodily mechanisms or vehicles of
consciousness in a given organism. In this case our focus will
be on such questions as ‘how consciousness is produced or
implemented in an organism,’ and ‘what the specific processes
responsible for the occurrence of a given conscious content
are.’ The processes that science correlates most often with
consciousness are certain types of neuronal activity: the so called
neuronal correlates of consciousness or NCC’s (see Frith et al.,
1999; Edelman and Tononi, 2000; Metzinger, 2000; Hohwy, 2009;
Aru et al., 2012; Paulewicz and Wierzchon´, 2015; Koch et al.,
2016). What is worth adding here is that we cannot exclude the
possibility of certain non-biological, artificial systems possessing,
in the future, enough causal power to produce at least primitive
forms of consciousness (Chella and Manzotti, 2007; Torrance
et al., 2007; Clowes and Seth, 2008; Kurzweil, 2012; O’Regan,
2012). Hence, this dimension can be generalized to include all
mechanisms (be they biological or not) capable of producing
consciousness, such as may be labeled structural or physical. We
shall, however, leave the term ‘physiological’ in place here, as up
to now consciousness has only been observed and experienced
in vivo and in situ.
The Functional Dimension
The dimension relates to the usefulness exhibited by conscious
information: i.e., to the question of ‘what it affords’ in
respect of a given creature’s actions (Gibson, 1977, 1979/1986;
Engel et al., 2013). It seems that organisms able to utilize
conscious information in order to, say, control, adapt or
choose action patterns in given circumstances must have
been more efficacious and statistically more successful –
otherwise the ability to be conscious probably would not
have survived (Lindahl, 1997; Baars, 2002, 2012; Griffin, 2001;
Feinberg and Mallatt, 2013, 2016). Consequently, when it
comes to this dimension what we are focused on is neither
its experiential qualities (what-it-is-like), nor its reference
(aboutness), nor the physical processes in which it is embedded
(production mechanisms), but rather its pragmatic function
(usefulness in action).
The question we shall be addressing below is, then, as
follows: in what sense might consciousness be phenomenally,
physiologically, semantically and functionally graded, and how
might we measure such gradedness?
PHENOMENAL GRADEDNESS
Epistemically, subjective aspects of conscious seeing, touching,
thinking, talking, moving, having a certain mood, feeling pain,
feeling anxious, angry, etc., correspond to particular ways in
which conscious contents are experienced as the processes they
involve unfold. For example, when seeing something, one may
experience more or less clear, vivid, blurred, bright, sharp, etc.,
images of certain objects or scenes in their specific situational
contexts (in ways informed by both prior experiences and
the actual environmental circumstances). The same goes for
other types of experience, except that the list of epithets suited
to describing the information available from the first-person
perspective will grow. Everything that we might mention, think
of, or refer to in response to the questions ‘What is it like to have
that particular conscious content?’ and ‘How was that particular
content experienced?’ relates to the phenomenal dimension. Any
other party, except the experiencing subject, is bereft of such an
exact and direct ‘view from within,’ and therefore must rely upon
the testimony of the subject regarding what has been experienced,
together with observations of his or her behavior.
In what sense, then, might consciousness be phenomenally
graded, and how could we measure this? Experiences are
more or less vivid, sharp, intense, clear, rich, detailed, etc. It
may be said, therefore, that what is graded is their vividness,
sharpness, intensity, clarity, etc. – or, in more general terms,
their informational quality. Several experimental procedures have
been proposed in psychology to tackle this problem: e.g., signal-
detection-based methods, free verbal reports, structured verbal
report scales, and no-report measures or phenomenological
methods, to name just a few (for a review of these, see, for
example: Heavey and Hurlburt, 2008; Overgaard and Sandberg,
2012; Wierzchon´ et al., 2012; Overgaard, 2015; Tsuchiya et al.,
2015). Here, we shall focus on structured verbal report scales: i.e.,
on so called subjective measures of consciousness, which target
the phenomenal dimension of experience and aim to estimate
in quantitative terms the graded informational quality of certain
contents of consciousness.
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A prominent and oft-cited example is the Perceptual
Awareness Scale (PAS), which estimates the subjective visibility
of a stimulus on a four-point verbal scale whose response
categories are labeled (1) “no experience,” (2) “brief glimpse,”
(3) “almost clear experience,” and (4) “clear experience” (see
Ramsøy and Overgaard, 2004). Most of the papers using these
methods show that the informational quality captured with this
scale is graded, in the sense that (1) participants tend to use all
available responses, (2) a correlation with accuracy is observed
across all four points of the scale, and (3) the psychophysical
functions of response accuracy and stimulus visibility change
gradually as a function of stimulus salience (manipulated in
terms of presentation time or stimulus contrast – see, for
example, Windey and Cleeremans, 2015). Similar analyses have
been proposed for other structured verbal report scales, such
as a confidence ratings scale or a post-decision wagering scale
(Sandberg et al., 2010, 2011).
When we rely on subjective reports, as the above-mentioned
methods do, what is it that we are actually measuring? Are
we directly measuring the quality of conscious experience, or
the quality of information about these? Put another way, do
the reports given by participants capture the variability of the
phenomenal aspect of consciousness, or rather reflect their
introspective or metacognitive ability (Overgaard and Sandberg,
2012)? The next section should hopefully shed some light on this
issue. It will also enable us to show the differences across the
various measures, as those are, at least partially, a matter of a
semantic gradation. It is also worth adding here that not every
creature is able to report its own experiences, which of course
does not mean that it has no experiences of a certain quality!
What it does mean, however, is that report-based, subjective
measures are going to be blind to that.
SEMANTIC GRADEDNESS
Conscious contents are not just experienced in some particular
way or other: they are also about something or other. In other
terms, besides the subject of consciousness, there is also an object
it refers to. “The subjective (subject-related) and intentional
(object-directed) dimensions of experience are intertwined with
each other as dimensions correlatively constituting a single act
of consciousness” (Legrand, 2007, p. 577). There is a variety
of referential objects that a given subject may be aware of:
e.g., certain perceptions, emotions, feelings, thoughts, memories,
etc. In asking whether consciousness is semantically graded, we
are really asking about the gradability of the relation between
some subjectively experienced content and its reference. The
relation may be graded in a sense of being more or less abstract.
For example, we may not only consciously see something
(lower-order visual awareness), but may also be aware of seeing
(higher-order awareness); in such cases, the awareness of visual
objects is less abstract than the awareness of the process of seeing
(see, in this regard, the many examples of this kind presented
in Dretske, 2006). More generally, if a subject may not only be
‘conscious of something,’ but also ‘aware of being conscious of
something,’ or even ‘conscious of the fact that he or she was aware
of being conscious of something,’ etc. (see Jonkisz, 2012), then
it may be said that consciousness is semantically graded (with
abstractness as a gradable aspect).
This relatively straightforward idea of contents of
consciousness being reflected in higher-order states may be
traced back as far as Aristotle and his theory of inner sense (see
De Anima, 425b, pp. 12–25, in Hamlyn, 1968, pp. 47–48). It is
also visible in certain models of consciousness known today: for
example, in so called higher-order theories (see Rosenthal, 1986;
Lycan, 1996; Gennaro, 2005). The idea of metacognition may also
be interpreted partly in these terms (see Overgaard and Sandberg,
2012; Shea et al., 2014). But, we may ask, is the phenomenon
of consciousness actually graded semantically in such a simple,
linear fashion? The issue certainly needs to be explored in greater
detail, as it is not clear, for example, how we should interpret
cases of perception of higher- versus lower-level (or lower-order)
features, such as meanings or object categories, as distinct from
colors, motions, locations, etc. [This scenario is described, for
instance, by Bayne et al. (2016, p. 409), when relating global
states to contents, and by Windey et al. (2013, 2014) in their
experimental tasks involving different levels of processing]. Is the
semantic relation in such cases more or less abstract because
the referential objects themselves are more or less abstract,
or because a given subject needs higher, metacognitive orders
of awareness to extract or refer to the higher-order features
(categories, meanings, etc.)?
Unfortunately, here also (as in the case of qualitative,
phenomenal aspects) we do not observe more or less abstract
‘meanings,’ or their ‘referential objects,’ directly, either in the
brain or in the behavior of a given participant. Yet, when the latter
behaves in a certain way, reports knowing certain things, and/or
his or her brain reveals specific activity patterns, it is possible to
infer with varying degrees of probability what he or she is aware
of, and it may then also be feasible to assess just how abstract that
awareness could be. For example, when a given person is asked
to watch people playing basketball and let us know when a gorilla
has been spotted (as in the classic experiment testing inattentional
blindness – see Simons and Chabris, 1999), and the participant
fulfills this complex task accurately, we may infer that he or she
has not only consciously seen something, but must also have been
aware of what it was – and, in order to let us know, must even have
been aware of having been aware. However, if we wish to assess
or, more importantly, to measure semantic orders of awareness,
we will probably need to design specific order-related tasks.
Differentiation in terms of semantic orders might prove useful
when it comes to indicating the differences between the subjective
measures mentioned in the previous section. For example, PAS
and Confidence Ratings methods are used in typical backward
masking scenarios: i.e., when participants are presented with a
near-threshold stimulus followed by a mask, and then judge the
stimulus according to both objective (e.g., identification) and
subjective (e.g., visibility) measures (see, for example, Sandberg
et al., 2010, 2011; Wierzchon´ et al., 2014). Both these methods
are based on structured subjective reports, yet to fulfill the task
requirements, participants have to report specific information
they are aware of which actually seems to differ as regards the
order of abstraction involved. With the PAS, a participant has
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to be aware of the quality of his or her own experience of an
object flashed on the screen (e.g., a face), whereas in the case of
the Confidence Ratings a participant has to be aware of his or her
own confidence in his or her visual experience of that object (see
Wierzchon´ et al., 2014). It seems, therefore, that PAS methods
require a semantically lower-order form of awareness than do
Confidence Ratings methods. On the other hand, assuming that
first-order awareness corresponds to awareness of a stimulus
(e.g., a face), and not to awareness either of the experiential
quality of the stimulus or of one’s confidence in one’s own
awareness of the stimulus, it may be said that neither the PAS
nor the Confidence Ratings approach measure the awareness
of a stimulus directly. Even the PAS inevitably requires a
metacognitive judgment about stimulus visibility (i.e., whether
I indeed saw a face, and how I should categorize the quality of
that experience in the light of the PAS categories). Summarizing
these considerations, it may be stated that at the lowest-order
level there is ‘awareness of the stimulus’ (e.g., a face seen on the
screen), that above this there is then a more abstract ‘awareness
of the visibility of the stimulus’ (as required by the PAS), and that
beyond this there is the most abstract ‘awareness of confidence
about the visibility of the stimulus’ (as required by the Confidence
Ratings approach).
PHYSIOLOGICAL GRADEDNESS
Consciousness, as observed in both humans and certain animals,
is correlated with the presence of certain physiological processes:
i.e., specific forms of metabolic and electrochemical activity
observed in the nervous systems of conscious organisms. Using
lesion studies (Laureys et al., 2015), modern neuroimaging
methods (see Bandettini, 2009), electroencephalography (EEG)
and transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), we can observe
and modulate the way these processes unfold in the human or
animal brain over both very short and longer periods of time
(see Edelman and Seth, 2009; Bisenius et al., 2015; Koch et al.,
2016). It is thus possible to establish not only their location,
but also, more importantly, their specific activity patterns.
Although there are lots of knowledge-gaps and disagreements
about the neuronal correlates of consciousness (see, for example:
Crick and Koch, 1990; Hohwy, 2009), it may be said that in
humans the phenomenon is most probably caused or generated
within the thalamocortical system and the ascending activating
systems originating in the brainstem and subcortical regions
(see Blumenfeld, 2016, pp. 3–29). In what sense, then, may
consciousness be physiologically graded, and how can we
measure and model it?
The most appropriate approach here would surely be to
attempt to define the neural underpinnings of consciousness as
some sort of general property of overall dynamic brain activity
patterns. One of the most developed proposals in this regard
is the theory of integrated information of Tononi (2004, 2008).
Integration is defined as the effective sharing of information
between parts of the system (Tononi, 2008, 2010; see also Tononi
et al., 2016, for an updated version of the theory). Effective
information associated with the “weakest link” of some possible
system bipartition can be represented by a single numerical
value named 8, which represents the whole system’s capacity
to integrate information. Another formulation of the integration
idea is Anil Seth’s notion of causal density (Seth et al., 2006).
This measure aims at capturing dynamic heterogeneity among
network elements and their global dynamic interaction. As in
the case of Tononi’s proposal, causal density can be computed
as a single value “cd,” which can also change gradually, its values
depending on the fraction of interactions between neuronal
elements that are causally significant at a given moment (Seth
et al., 2006; Seth, 2008; Barrett and Seth, 2011).
Recently, Massimini and colleagues have proposed an
empirical indicator of the capacity of the brain to generate
complex patterns of activity: a perturbational complexity index
(PCI) (Casali et al., 2013). This parameter is based on measuring
the cortical patterns of electrophysiological responses to neural
network perturbation induced by repeated TMS pulses. In short,
PCI, using algorithmic complexity calculations, is assumed to
measure the capacity of the thalamocortical system for effective
and rapid interactions. According to its proponents, PCI should
be interpreted as an EEG-based indicator of integration and
differentiation of neural activity, and thus also directly relates to
the basic tenets of Tononi’s theory. Extensive studies on normal
subjects in wakefulness, at various stages of sleep, and undergoing
various levels of anesthesia, as well as post-coma patients with
severe brain damage, have proved that the single value of the
PCI indicator can indeed distinguish between various forms of
impairment of consciousness (Casali et al., 2013). To be specific,
higher values of the PCI indicate normal waking consciousness,
while lower levels point to forms of absent or severely impaired
consciousness. In a follow-up study, with numerous subject
samples (Casarotto et al., 2016), the predictive accuracy of PCI
was tentatively confirmed by observing relatively high values
of PCI (within the range of conscious controls) in a group of
patients who had been behaviorally diagnosed as vegetative, thus
implying a capacity to retain consciousness despite a limited
capacity for motor response.
It may be said that all the above-mentioned proposals “attempt
to quantify the balance between integration and differentiation
exhibited by a neural system” (Seth et al., 2006, p. 10800)
and aim at measuring and modeling (in their own way) the
overall dynamic complexity of the activity patterns correlated with
consciousness. Although, the complexity is understood differently
in these approaches (either as a global feature of the interactions
between relevant neural networks or as a feature of cortical
EEG-responses to TMS perturbations), it might qualify as a
reasonable candidate for a gradable element in the physiological
dimension. Unfortunately, although a certain level of neural
complexity seems necessary, it still remains uncertain whether
high complexity-values will possess enough predictive accuracy
to indicate consciousness consistently.
FUNCTIONAL GRADEDNESS
It seems intuitively right to assert that consciousness plays
a vital role in many forms of complex behavior: in decision
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making, action planning, problem solving, thinking, reasoning,
learning, etc. (see Baars, 2002, 2012; Merker, 2005; Morsella,
2005; Cohen and Dennett, 2011). At the same time, it also appears
closely related to various cognitive processes or functions, such
as attention, language, and working memory (see Baars and
Franklin, 2003; Lamme, 2006; Bor and Seth, 2012). A number
of studies – that together make up the so called ‘integration
consensus’ (a term coined in Seth, 2009) – suggest that the
role of consciousness is to integrate signals and information
from different internal systems (e.g., memory, motor, sensory)
and external resources (see Baars, 1994, 2002; Dehaene et al.,
1998; Edelman and Tononi, 2000; Dehaene and Naccache, 2001;
Edelman, 2003; Tononi, 2004, 2008, 2010; Seth et al., 2005; Seth,
2009; Dehaene and Changeux, 2011; Edelman et al., 2011; Palmer
and Ramsey, 2012; Baars et al., 2013; Tononi and Koch, 2014).
There are, however, examples of unconscious decision-making
(Soon et al., 2008), implicit learning (Stadler and Frensch, 1997),
attention without consciousness (Koch and Tsuchiya, 2007),
unconscious working memory (Soto et al., 2011), and neuronal
integration without consciousness (Mudrik et al., 2014). So, is it
possible for unconscious processes to perform all these functions?
Unfortunately, it does not, at least for the moment, seem feasible
to give any definite answer to this (see Hassin, 2013; Hesselmann
and Moors, 2015).
All the same, the assertion that the capacity for consciousness
holds rather high evolutionary value (Lindahl, 1997; Griffin, 2001;
Feinberg and Mallatt, 2013, 2016) simply by virtue of being
useful or efficacious in certain conditions still seems justified.
That view is by no means a new one, as it was already put
forward by William James: “[t]he particulars of the distribution
of consciousness, so far as we know them, point to its being
efficacious. . . it seems an organ, superadded to other organs
which maintain the animal in the struggle for existence; and
the presumption of course is that it helps him in some way in
the struggle. . .” (James, 1890, cited in Seth, 2009). Of course,
unconscious (or less conscious) information processing is also
useful, and even more efficacious than conscious one, in many
situations (e.g., when speed is more crucial than accuracy, when
suitable action patterns are well-known or routinely performed,
etc.). Therefore, the crucial functional question does not concern
the adaptive value of consciousness, which seems obvious, but
rather the reason why it is valuable (in the sense of being
useful) in certain situations, or what it affords its possessor. As
far as we know, consciousness enables flexible behavior, which
is revealed in a creature’s ability to alter and adapt its actions
in line with developing changes in its environment, to correct
motor, perceptual or cognitive errors, to compare predictions
with actual conditions, to detect differences, to test and sample
planned action virtually, etc. (see Pally, 2005; Seth, 2009; Baars
et al., 2013). It seems quite likely that such flexibility in acting may
be the reason why consciousness is most efficacious in certain
circumstances. If that is so, then indeed, the flexibility which
consciousness offers may be proposed as a reasonable candidate
for its distinctive function.
So, in what sense might consciousness be functionally graded?
The usefulness of the flexibility in acting made possible by
conscious processing of this or that information depends on the
specific conditions of the moment. Therefore, when conditions
change, the same information may turn out to be more or
less useful when conscious – and, conversely, in the same
conditions, different information may present varying degrees of
usefulness (in virtue of enabling flexibility in respect of a different
set of actions). Ultimately, then, the functional gradedness of
consciousness may be identified with varying degrees of usefulness
offered by sets of flexible actions enabled by conscious processing.
How might we measure the degrees of usefulness enabled
by conscious processing? This definitely does not seem like a
straightforward task, as it is structured and limited by both
objective and subjective factors. Objective factors pertain to
ongoing conditions in a given creature’s surroundings (spatio-
temporal relations, exposure times, reaction times, locations,
motions, etc.). Subjective factors, on the other hand, are
concerned with everything that is subject-dependent: actual
physiological states, repertoires of action patterns, preferences,
needs, expectations, etc. All these are unique to a given creature-
subject, and will have been shaped by the latter’s individual
history, by genetic and epigenetic possibilities and traits, and
by actual environmental interactions (see Jonkisz, 2016). At
least some of these subjective factors will not be directly
accessible (preferences, moods, expectations, feelings, etc.), so
the measure of functional gradedness, if developed, will have to
be at least partly indirect (i.e., based on reports or probability
calculations).
The functional gradedness of consciousness, understood
in terms of varying degrees of usefulness, fits well with the
increasingly popular Bayesian brain metaphor, according to
which our cognitive system is a kind of prediction or inference
machine (an idea already introduced into neuroscience by
Helmholtz – see Helmholtz, 1866/1962). The information with
the highest level of expected efficacy may be interpreted as being
(in the Bayesian sense) statistically the most useful if conscious
(see Jonkisz, 2016). If neuronal systems indeed work according
to the principles of Bayesian statistics, then the most functional
information (from the predictive perspective of some given
system) may be identified with consciousness. Yet it remains
debatable how the nervous system achieves this: i.e., whether
it actually calculates the probabilities or rather just samples
expected efficacy (see Sanborn and Chater, 2016; Seth and
Friston, 2016).
DISCUSSION
To determine whether it is the phenomenal, semantic,
physiological or functional hierarchy that is under consideration
(especially where this cannot be directly inferred from the
context), certain more precise conceptual demarcations
between such terms as ‘grades,’ ‘orders,’ ‘levels,’ and ‘degrees’
of consciousness may well prove useful (however, the terms
are sometimes used interchangeably; see, for example, Bayne
et al., 2016). If that is indeed the case, the following practical
guidelines should perhaps be embraced. Firstly, the expression
‘grades of consciousness,’ often used in the literature in relation
to subjective measures, is best suited to expressing the idea
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of phenomenal quality grades. Meanwhile, the semantic-
abstraction hierarchy is best captured by the notion of ‘orders
of consciousness’ (as in cases of higher-order theories). On the
other hand, as regards the physiological dimension and the idea
of progressive complexity revealed by neuronal activity patterns,
the term ‘levels of consciousness’ is most appropriate. Finally,
when it comes to the hierarchy of functional usefulness, the term
‘degrees of consciousness’ seems suitable.
At this point it is also worth echoing the caveat issued
by Bayne et al. (2016), to the effect that the “science of
consciousness has been overly hasty in employing the notion of
a conscious level as a central theoretical construct.” We ourselves
are not convinced, either that the notion “has become [indeed]
a key theoretical construct in the science of consciousness,”
or that it is understood one-dimensionally in most instances
of its application. The notion is employed by clinicians with
reference to a patient’s overall conscious state, the latter being
assessed (mainly quantitatively) according to various protocols
and scales (e.g., Glasgow Coma Scale, Coma Recovery Scale – see
Schnakers et al., 2008; see also Giacino, 2005). Such diagnoses,
crucial for recovery prognoses in post-comatose patients with
disorders of consciousness, have to be simple: hence their linear
form. Yet the data used in the assessment protocols actually
pertains to many of the dimensions of consciousness described
above. For example, the patient’s behavioral responsiveness is
a functional parameter, while the extent and localisation of
brain lesions relates to the physiological dimension. Patients
are also asked certain questions (“Is your name Donald?”),
or may be given certain instructions (“Look up!,” “Touch the
table!,” “Show us how to use a fork!,” or even something
more abstract, such as “Imagine playing tennis!” – see Owen
et al., 2006). To complete such tasks, patients must undergo a
specific conscious experience with a definite referential content;
hence, the phenomenological and semantic dimensions are also
involved. If that is so, then the one-dimensional character of
levels of consciousness amounts to a mis-specification: scales
may yield single scores implying some sort of linear continuum
of conscious levels, but in fact they are using multidimensional
data. We do not think, therefore, that there is a justified worry
either about using the term ‘level of consciousness’ in ways other
than those with specifically clinical connotations, or about such
a practice directly engendering a one-dimensional account of
consciousness.
Is it useful, either theoretically or explanatorily, we may
ask, to dissect consciousness into four distinct dimensions and
gradable aspects? In fact, the dimensions have already proved
useful, enabling us to link together the numerous varieties
of consciousness and fit them all into a fourfold taxonomy
(see Jonkisz, 2012, 2015). Moreover, it has been shown here
that the semantic orders of consciousness also prove helpful
when seeking to characterize new and important differences
between subjective measures of awareness (see Wierzchon´
et al., 2014). It is hoped, moreover, that the conception of
consciousness as graded in four different dimensions (or as
‘4D’) outlined here will also prove explanatorily useful in the
interpretation of a variety of phenomena. For example, locked-
in syndrome may be interpreted within the 4D framework
as a case where a patient is able to present high grades of
phenomenal quality, abstract semantic orders, and complex
physiological levels, but lowered degrees of functional usefulness
of conscious processing. That is because his or her consciousness
is functionally inefficacious in respect of motor actions, yet
may still be functionally intact when it comes to reasoning,
thinking, etc. The blindsight phenomenon, on the other hand,
may be described as a condition in which visual consciousness
presents very low phenomenal grades and semantic orders, as a
blindsighted patient, in most cases, has barely any experiences
or referential contents that he or she is able to report. Also,
levels of physiological complexity of the visual process will
most likely be lowered – though this depends on the extent
of lesions in the visual areas (see Stoerig and Barth, 2001;
Overgaard et al., 2008). Nevertheless, in cases of blindsight
awareness may still possess a certain degree of functionality,
as the information may prove efficacious up to a certain point
where spatial navigation is concerned, or when guessing what
has been seen (see Mazzi et al., 2016). Consciousness graded
in four dimensions, moreover, presents us with a potentially
highly advantageous scenario in respect of descriptions and
comparisons concerning consciousness in non-human animals,
in humans in early infancy, and in artificial-systems. (At least,
we may hypothesize that this is so: for example, a child’s
consciousness will naturally be less semantically abstract, but a
young infant is likely to have phenomenally more distinct and
intense sensory experiences in each modality, as their sensory
areas will be less integrated within the brain.) It seems reasonable
to assert that consciousness, as something manifested across
different species, at different developmental stages, or in different
categories of system, is unlikely to be successfully described
and compared if these four gradable aspects are not taken into
account.
It is also hoped that the 4D framework will ultimately result in
many testable hypotheses and predictions being generated. Such
possibilities will mostly concern possible dependencies between
the four hierarchies. For example, in the realm of the dimensions
proposed it would be interesting to determine how phenomenal
quality is related to functional usefulness (e.g., whether low-
quality grades diminish the degree of usefulness), or to investigate
the extent to which the parameter of physiological complexity
affects orders of abstraction (It can be assumed here that higher
metacognitive orders of abstraction will require a high level
of complexity). It also seems worthwhile to explore whether
higher semantic orders could ever correlate with low phenomenal
quality. In the latter case, if semantically abstract information
were to result predominantly in high phenomenal quality, while
lower-order information correlated with a more unstable quality,
then such results would be compatible with the Level of Processing
Hypothesis (see Windey et al., 2013, 2014), which claims that low-
level stimuli result in more gradual experience. This would then
compromise both the all-or-none approach proposed by Sergent
and Dehaene (2004, where relatively abstract stimuli [word
number] resulted predominantly in either very high or very
low quality) and the graded-consciousness account described
by Overgaard et al. (2006, where relatively less abstract stimuli
[orthogonal lines] resulted in much more unstable quality).
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CONCLUSION
Our major aim in this article has been to answer the following
question: what, exactly, is it that is graded in the case of
consciousness? Our proposal has been that there are four
different gradable aspects of conscious information: quality,
abstractness, complexity and usefulness, which belong to four
different dimensions, these being understood, respectively,
as phenomenal, semantic, physiological, and functional.
Consequently, conscious information processing in a 4D-
framework may be said to present four different hierarchies:
grades of phenomenal quality, orders of semantic abstraction,
levels of physiological complexity, and degrees of functional
usefulness. The approach set out here not only enables us to
draw attention to certain new and important differences in
respect of subjective measures of awareness, but also allows
for an innovative interpretation of a variety of well-known
phenomena (Amongst these, the interpretations of blindsight and
locked-in syndrome entailed have been briefly outlined above).
Moreover, it makes possible many predictions and hypotheses
that can be experimentally tested – a few of which were briefly
described in the previous section. Hopefully, the results will
ultimately help to explain, or even conclusively answer, some
of the problems described in the introduction. Of course, to
determine whether the direction taken by this inquiry is the
right one, still more research is needed, and this may ultimately
lead to the development of forms of measurement oriented
specifically toward this or that particular gradable aspect of
consciousness. Above all, it is hoped that the 4D framework will
enable discussions about the hierarchical nature of consciousness
to be pursued with significantly greater accuracy and clarity in
the future.
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